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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000809

SIPDIS

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TAGS: PREL UNSC ETTC SU PGOV

SUBJECT: UN/SUDAN SANCTIONS: U.S. ISOLATED ON NEW NAMES

REF: A. STATE 94825
¶B. STATE 61842
¶C. USUN 486
¶D. PARIS 1671
¶E. PARIS 1104
¶F. PARIS 1036
¶G. PARIS 1005
¶H. BEIJING 2201

Classified By: Alternate Permanent Representative Amb. Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons: 1.4(B) AND (D).

¶11. (C) SUMMARY: USUN convened a P3 meeting on September 4 to discuss the U.S. proposal to submit to the Sudan Sanctions Committee four new names for targeted sanctions. France remains opposed to the entire U.S. approach, believing that new sanctions would undermine ongoing dialogue processes and undermine the accomplishment of other goals in Sudan and the region. The UK, originally supportive of our approach, said that due to recent developments London's position is now more similar to that of Paris. France's Deputy PermRep to the UN reiterated to Amb. DiCarlo France's opposition, but allowed that France could support new sanctions if they occurred within the framework of ongoing UN/AU mediation efforts. USUN recommends holding off temporarily on proposing these names until we are able to move forward with firm P3 support; France's suggestion to integrate the threat of sanctions into current mediation efforts could help broaden support for new sanctions in the Council. END SUMMARY.

FRANCE STILL REJECTS U.S. APPROACH; UK TEPID

¶12. (C) Per ref A, USUN convened on September 4 a P3 meeting to discuss the U.S. proposal to submit four new names to the Sudan Sanctions Committee for targeted sanctions (asset freeze / travel ban). USUN emphasized that recent violence, notably government attacks on villages and the rebel advance on Omdurman last May, demanded a response from the international community, and that our balanced list included both government and anti-government malefactors for whom we had evidence that they met the criteria for sanctions under UNSCR 1591.

¶13. (C) Clement LeClerc, the Sudan expert at France's UN mission, explained that France still opposes moving forward with these four names now. According to LeClerc, Paris believes new sanctions would derail ongoing mediation and dialogue efforts underway involving Chad, Sudan and the various rebel movements. Noting the current divisions in the Security Council, LeClerc asserted that it would be highly problematic to move forward without P3 unity. LeClerc reiterated France's longstanding position that imposing sanctions on one of the individuals -- Dauossa Deby, the

half-brother of Chad's president -- could end Chad's cooperation with international missions, particularly the EUFOR follow-on force. LeClerc added that France had no information that Deby had engaged in bad behavior in recent months, but would welcome receiving any such information that the United States may possess.

¶4. (C) LeClerc also raised the possibility that "Sudan's friends" might use the Sudan Sanctions Committee's procedures to ensure that the Committee only approves sanctioning the anti-government rebel, Khalil Ibrahim, while rejecting the other three names. (NOTE: This is theoretically possible. The Committee approves or rejects names individually, not on a slate -- therefore, Libya and/or China could theoretically place holds on all the names except Ibrahim. END NOTE). If this were done, LeClerc insisted, the Government of Sudan would win a propaganda victory and be let off the hook.

¶5. (C) LeClerc asked whether Washington had considered Paris' proposal to sanction Chadian rebels. USUN responded (per ref A guidance) that the United States would be willing to work with the French to designate some (one or two) of these Chadian rebels if that ensured French support for the inclusion of Daoussa Deby in our proposal of four names now.

¶6. (C) UKUN mission expert Sofka Brown noted that London originally supported the U.S. approach and had formally approved listing the four new individuals in May. Yet since then, she explained, new mediation processes had been launched and there have been other new developments, notably the prospect of new International Criminal Court (ICC)

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indictments. As a result, she said, the UK now has "a similar approach to France" and would have to rethink the issue before agreeing to move forward now. Brown added that the timing of this proposal -- with the ICC issue looming and just before the UN General Assembly ministerial week -- was poor.

FRENCH DPR: MAYBE IN DIFFERENT FRAMEWORK

¶7. (C) Ambassador DiCarlo subsequently raised ref A points with French DPR Jean-Pierre Lacroix on September 5. Lacroix confirmed that France believed it was premature to consider sanctions in Darfur, especially since the international community's main leverage now lie in the ICC discussion. He reiterated France's position that sanctioning President Deby's half-brother would harm Chad's cooperation with the international missions and added that Chadian rebels would use it to weaken Deby internally.

¶8. (C) According to Lacroix, Paris believes that sanctions would only be effective in the context of the negotiating efforts of Djibril Bassole, the UN/AU Chief Mediator to Darfur. He added that new sanctions should only be used in support of the political processes now underway in Sudan (i.e., between the government and Darfur rebels groups) and Chad (i.e., between President Deby and Chadian rebel groups).

RECOMMENDED WAY FORWARD

¶9. (C) In light France's position (reiterated in ref C, D, E, F, G), the UK's lack of enthusiasm and China's near-certain opposition (ref H), USUN recommends holding off temporarily on this initiative until we are able to move forward with firm P3 support. If we propose new names for sanctions without P3 support, we run a high risk of public failure that would undermine accomplishing our other goals in Sudan and antagonize our allies. USUN also recommends against bypassing the Sudan Sanctions Committee and forcing a Council vote on our proposed names -- this course of action would worsen an already tense atmosphere in the Council and

have unpredictable consequences, such as the likelihood Council members would insist on inserting unacceptable ICC language in any sanctions resolution.

¶110. (C) USUN notes that French officials (ref D) have previously left open the possibility that they could support new sanctions in the coming weeks and months if these individuals' bad behavior continues. France's suggestion that further rounds of targeted sanctions be tied to Bassole's mediation efforts (presumably as a "stick" to threaten against those who do not cooperate) may be worth exploring. This kind of integrated approach would likely broaden support in the Council for new targeted sanctions.
Khalilzad